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Currently, business management is far from being recognised as a profession. This paper suggests
that a professional spirit should be developed which could function as a filter of commercial reason-
ing. Broadly, management will not be organised within the framework of a well-established profes-
sion unless formal knowledge, licensing, professional autonomy and professional codes of conduct
are developed sufficiently. In developing business management as a profession, law may play a key
role. Where the idea is that business management should be more professionalised, managers must
show that they are willing to adopt ethical values, while arriving at business decisions. The paper ar-
gues that ethics cannot survive without legal regulation, which, in turn, will not be supported by law
unless lawyers can find alternative solutions to the large mechanisms of the official society, secured
by the monopolised coercion of the nation state. From a micro perspective of law and business eth-
ics, communities can be developed with their own conventions, rules and standards that are gener-
ated and sanctioned within the boundaries of the communities themselves.
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Business decisions have been strongly criticised in the recent years. Blind faith in
narrow economic models, indifference to ethical issues, anomalies and manipula-
tions in management have been explored. The suspicion has grown in leading
business schools that something has gone wrong with the business school
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programmes. The idea has emerged that a framework should be developed for
business decisions and management, in which business could be converted into a
profession. This paper joins to the arguments in support of the need to profession-
alise the management of businesses. A special consideration is offered by the pa-
per implying that the legal aspect of decision-making may help businesses corrob-
orate in the process of professionalising business management.
1. BUSINESS MANAGEMENT AS AN UNDER-PROFESSIONALISED
OCCUPATION
The management of businesses is an under-professionalised occupation today.
Sociologists studying professions have employed a wide range of criteria for de-
termining what makes an occupation a profession. Four criteria are extremely im-
portant in setting forth the essence of professionalism and comparing business
management with the “bona fide” professions, such as law and medicine
(Khurana – Nohria – Penrice 2005). These criteria are as follows:
(i) common body of knowledge resting on a well-developed, widely accepted
theoretical base;
(ii) a system for certifying that individuals possess such knowledge before being
licensed or otherwise admitted to practice;
(iii) commitment to applying specialised knowledge for the public good, and re-
nunciation of the goal of profit maximisation, in return for professional au-
tonomy and monopoly power; and
(iv) code of ethics, with provisions for monitoring individual compliance with the
code and a system of sanctions for enforcing it.
The idea of management as a profession is plainly manifested in the proposed
Hippocratic oath of managers (Khurana – Nohria 2008: 72–73).
Business management must not remain unregulated. Business activities must
not be motivated merely by seeking for profit. They should be ennobled, and de-
veloped within the frames of a profession, or even a vocation. Louis Brandeis
realised already in 1912 (Brandeis 1912) that the scope of recognised professions
was being broadened (see in that respect, for example, the profession of engi-
neers). Although we have been experiencing the time when capital is concentrated
in the process of production, property is dispersed in terms of a large number of
shareholders, and capital is built in the administrative system of the monopolised
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power of special knowledge, the process in which business management is con-
verted into a profession has not yet been completed.
The formalisation of special skills and knowledge has not yet reached a level
necessary for the creation of business management as a profession. The theory of
corporate finance, for example, has already been developed, but this discipline
has not been able sufficiently to reflect the requirements arising from the social
environment of corporate functioning. While elaborating sophisticated methods
of measuring risks, profits, costs and benefits, the theory of corporate finance has
forgotten about the fact that business decisions cannot be made in a socially empty
place, devoid of human deliberations that can hardly be directly converted into ec-
onometric formulae. The opportunity cost of decisions must be interpreted not
only as a matter incurring financial costs. It is also important to understand that
business decisions place on the participants of markets social burdens as well.
A profession can be located in a sphere where special knowledge is used, in the
process of which those who pursue a profession leave the realm of mere egoism
and cease to be bound to categories that can be measured according to the laws of
the market only. Whether someone is successful depends not only on the fact if the
decision-maker himself or herself is better off or not. It is also important that all
parties involved in the bargain must be better off. It is superior to go beyond mere
egoism than being bound to individual strategies, which is because building up
personal connections and gaining better understanding of others can enhance the
benefits of each social player.
Business management can become a profession, provided that at least two con-
ditions are met:
(i) It is the substantive condition for the development of a profession that egoism
must be superseded. This is the way in which it is possible to get the recogni-
tion of professional autonomy from the society.
(ii) It is the cognitive condition for the development of a profession that econom-
ics must be accompanied by the formalisation of managerial sciences at a
level necessary for reaching professional standards.
The compensation paid for the professional performance must not directly de-
pend on how successful the professional proxy was in the matter in which he or
she assisted his or her principal. If such a direct link existed, the matter of reward
would be exaggerated, although financial compensation for the professional work
performed is in fact accidental to the assessment of this performance. The real suc-
cess should be more durable and comprehensive than it could be expressed from
time to time in terms of financial compensation. It is a matter of balance to be
achieved between humans that cannot be merely subject to quantitative measure-
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ment, as what is reached is also a matter of agreement that cannot be simply ex-
pressed in monetary terms.
Indeed, in the business life profit is a principle of generating success by and
large. One has to acknowledge as well that sustaining permanent losses is clearly a
failure. Large profits, however, do not necessarily mean that one is successful. It is
thus quite easy to describe if someone is successful in the business life in negative
terms. Nevertheless, once it is required to use positive terms and suggest what it
does mean to be successful, it is not enough to refer to the categories of profitabil-
ity and efficiency. To be successful means a type of harmony one can achieve with
others in particular social conditions. This is a kind of complexity that cannot be
described simply by econometric categories. Brandeis (1912) contends that
“‘Big business’ will (…) mean business big not in bulk or power, but great in service and
grand in manner. ‘Big business’ will mean professionalised business, as distinguished from
the occupation of petty trafficking or mere moneymaking.”
2. HISTORIC MODELS FOR BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
AS A PROFESSION
It may be important not only to involve professional standards in business deci-
sions, but also to try to benefit from the lesson to be drawn from the so-called lib-
eral arts. The pursuit of the Seven Free Arts suggests more than mere professional
recognition, as they negotiate originally universal values, not subject to necessi-
ties (Willmann 1907).
Becoming a professional suggests a possibility of leaving the world of mere
pragmatism, because business decisions can be filtered, and mitigated by the rules
reflecting a professional autonomy. A professional is still paying a fee. As a sec-
ond step, even the world of professions could be left. Going beyond the profes-
sional barriers, it is possible to become a layman, as opposed to a professional –
who is now not bound longer to any professional consideration. In this way, the
pursuit of a liberal profession suggests more than just following the rules of a pro-
fession. Instead, it is to rely on the universality of values that can be grasped
within the framework of the Seven Free Arts. Approaching such universality can-
not, however, take place without being complemented by spirituality.
In a modern society, professions mean independence, being present in the mar-
ket of the services they supply. They make use of their specialised knowledge and
are paid for the application of this knowledge to business matters. Due to their
presence in the market economy, they are able to organise their services independ-
ently of systematic state intervention, still in competition with each other. On the
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contrary, in a pre-capitalist society, professionals are part of the historically deter-
mined systems of personal dependences that are organised by non-economic insti-
tutions like the state or the magistrates of guilds. Despite their subordination to
non-economic factors, professionals are not necessarily precluded from exercis-
ing their vocation, while working as the masters of the work assigned to them. Ne-
cessity may be combined with the personal elevation of professional activities to
the higher level of a vocation.
Professionals may always aspire to become the masters of their work. To do
that, it is not enough for them just to establish financial independence. They also
need spiritual and moral freedom, getting rid of the narrow-minded perspective of
merely looking for profit. To that end, they must develop and preserve the inher-
ent logic and integrity of their profession, no matter if they are successful as busi-
nessmen or women.
The historic patterns of the Western-type educated professionals are the intel-
lectuals emerging in Europe in the Middle Ages. One of the early examples that
may encourage modern professionals comes from the Cluniac movement. The
monks of Cluny, and later a European-wide network of Benedictine monasteries,
introduced new standards for the monastic life, consisting not only of the
programme of spiritual and moral purification, but also of the idea that there could
be different ways of approaching the only God. The reforms of Cluny operating in
the 12th century were completed by the autonomy movements of local communi-
ties, organised in the 13th century against the feudal lords. City states of Northern
Italy and Germany were developed as the islands of freedom in the sea of feudal-
ism (“die städtische Luft macht frei”). The city life suggested a matter of locality,
compared to the comprehensive territorial jurisdiction of the feudal lords. The en-
hancement of the logic of locality in organising professional life was helpful in
avoiding the alienation effect of higher powers and developing mutual insights
and the respect of one’s neighbour. Thus, the supply of professional services re-
quired personal performance and devotion, underlying the technicalities of carry-
ing on professional activities.
The city provided room for the universities founded already in 13th century.
Their staff was recruited from the clerical intellectuals, being simultaneously en-
gaged in teaching and doing research. In fact, they were widely subject to profes-
sional regulations. They were, for example, obliged to respect the different rules
of conducting discussions on different matters. On the other hand, they benefited
from their privileges to obtain independence they found in the shadow of the per-
manent conflicts, which were prevalent between feudal lords and the Catholic
Church. Being clericals, they were, by definition, approximate to spirituality. At
the same time, they represented a link to the created world by developing profes-
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sional rules. One can admire the harmony they could form between spirituality
and the immanent world.
The clerical intellectuals were not far from the group of the “jongleurs” who
were also successful in seceding from the official hierarchies of the feudal society.
While maintaining their roots to spirituality, they were integral parts of the ev-
ery-day life. They enjoyed freedom paradoxically due to the fact that they ap-
peared in the guise of clowns and, as such, they were not recognised as full mem-
bers of the official society.
One of the famous examples for the scene of their presence is the “Roman de la
Rose”, ascribed to Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun, a work of the early 15th
century, providing the combination of allegories and high sensuality even up to
eroticism. The puzzling mixture of spirituality and physical desires is exemplified
in the triptych of Melun as well. In this painting, Jean Fouquet shows the model of
chastity and devotion, appearing in the person of Virgin Mary. In the portrait of
the Madonna, one can recognise, however, Agnes Sorel, a mistress of King
Charles VII, suggesting another source of attraction as well.
A businessman engaged in bargaining is a man with instincts and emotions
who arrives at good judgments, whose position is thus comparable to the character
of an artist. From this perspective, the model of jongleurs is available. They need
not be only the men of judgments, but may also have developed intimate relation-
ship with the higher values of loyalty, honesty and human dignity (as we know
good examples for that from Francois Villon). It is a point of orientation for busi-
nessmen as professionals as well to try to go beyond the border of simple bargain-
ing and substantiate their business with deeper understanding and moral consider-
ations.
Modern professionals can learn both from clerical intellectuals and jongleurs.
They have to appreciate that the freedom these ancestors acquired was used in or-
der to create works that could reflect a complete picture of life, including both im-
manent and transcendent values. Of course, not only positive, but also negative
models exist. For example, it may be welcome to simulate an artist like Walter of
Stolzing, a hero of Richard Wagner in the opera of “Meistersinger”, who cannot
get rid of a negative alter ego, represented by Beckmesser. People like Beckmes-
ser may flout the professional rules, desperately missing the complexity of life.
It is another important source of erudition for modern professionals to benefit
from the rational way of thinking that has been developed at the point of shifting
from Platonic idealism to Aristotelian rationality. The economy of the production
and exchange of commodities reached a level of development in the 13th century
when it was no longer possible to reconcile the poetic form of idealism inherited
from the Neo-Platonic and Patristic tradition with the emerging realities of a mar-
ket economy. The space for physical life and business was extended dramatically.
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It was then necessary to combine the Christian faith with the experience of the
new way of life. Thomas Aquinas and his comrades rediscovered Aristotle and
benefited from the balance, introduced in his works, between transcendent and
immanent values. Aristotle had the idea that the substance of things is hidden in
the things themselves, which can be explored, provided that affection, reason and
experience are mobilised and brought into harmony with each other. In this way,
beliefs fell under the control of logic and experience. In fact, there should be a link
even for modern professionals between spiritual values and the rapid develop-
ments of material life.
It is crucial for professionals to rely on rationality, or, rather, instrumental ra-
tionality. Rationality, however, must not be separated from humility. One must
see that there are constraints on cognition and social design. The European way of
rational thinking has traditionally emerged from coping with the question of Job
raised in the Middle Ages concerning the consequences of the commitment of
sins. From a Gnostic perspective, good and evil can be distinguished from each
other on the grounds that salvation cannot be reached and purity and chastity can-
not be preserved unless everything that belongs to the physical world is absent
from our life. Souls cannot be saved unless they are departed from the body. This
kind of Docetism cannot be reconciled with the physical experience of our mod-
ern life. Even the Catholic Church has found it as heretic that the intercourse with
what is corporeal would absolutely lead to vices.
The campaign against the Cathar heresy was introduced by the Mendicant fa-
thers in the 13th century. The Franciscan answer to the question concerning the re-
lationship between the commitment of sins and the physical world was that this
world created by God was brave and the Christians are invited to admire and enjoy
the ample gifts of this world. They have to show, however, affection to the crea-
tures of this world, in particular, they have to show compassion with those who
are needy. The Dominicans successfully proved that the reason given by God
could be brought into harmony both with affections and senses. Francesco of
Assisi discovered in his “Cantico di frate sole” the beauties of nature surrounding
our life and suggested that by way of entertaining affection, it was possible to get
into an intimate relationship with the objects of nature. Furthermore, Thomas
Aquinas was eminent in finding a language in his poem “Pange lingua gloriosi
corporis mysterium”, in which reason and religious faith could complement each
other in an amazing harmony.
The metaphors introduced in these poems can be encouraging for intellectuals
even today and can help professionals in not losing themselves to the mere prob-
lems of narrow-minded rationality, ideologies and the motivation of seeking
profit. The miracles of nature can be explored by the professionals who may in-
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voke the spirit of Saint Francis, while the beauties of reasoning, as shown by Saint
Thomas, can also be helpful to the professionals of our time.
Since Bernard of Chartres, it is known that intellectuals cannot survive without
their ancestors. One can thus be potent in solving current problems just because of
“standing on the shoulders of giants”. Indeed, no profession can be pursued suc-
cessfully unless professional methods are put in the context of the professional
spirit that can arise from traditions. Professional problems must not be reduced to
technicalities. Real answers cannot be given to real-life problems unless a profes-
sional takes the historical context into account. Traditions of course show us vari-
ous of trends that must be observed, but at the same time they also reveal freedom.
This is because a professional may choose the components of the relevant tradi-
tion that can be useful in solving the current problem.
3. GOING BEYOND INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY
A profession, representing more than simply carrying on commercial activities,
implies a double nature that consists of both instrumental rationality and a way of
thinking open to transcendent values. Upon the assessment of the possibility of
conversion from the simple business management into profession, it is important
to criticise instrumental rationality. Sumantra Ghoshal describes it by the overes-
timated use of explanation based on causal effects, by conducting research while
getting lost in the details and by the destructive mentality driven by mistrust and
the blind faith in seeking for the mere financial interests (Ghoshal 2005: 76). It is
pure negativity just to seek to take cognisance of bounded rationality and the pos-
sible reduction of costs. It is then naive just to believe that there are exact scientific
methods in doing in-depth analysis of the right economic conduct.
Clearly, the insufficiencies of the laws of the market cannot be adjusted by the
never-existing brave prince who, being omnipotent, would be able to fix correct
prices. It is also an illusion, on the other hand, to think that markets would produce
perfection, or that the establishment of a market economy would be a natural form
of the economic conduct. The economic conduct, related to instrumental rational-
ity and followed in correspondence with the laws of the market, is constrained due
to the fact that market players are inclined to disregard the considerations of oth-
ers. This inadvertently leads market players to opportunism. While defending
against opportunism, they show fears that others may prevent them from their full
satisfaction, and thus operate in isolation from one another, which is a sort of
one-sidedness, an inevitable constraint on better performance.
The operation of markets is overshadowed by imperfections due to the follow-
ing factors at least: (i) historically, the economic conduct is institutionalised and
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imbedded into non-economic factors; (ii) the logic of the market exchange is al-
ways complemented by the logic of the autarchy of simple households; and (iii)
instrumental rationality is not free from insufficiencies like egoism, negativism
and personal biases.
Economists must not think of being omniscient. They must take care of the lim-
its on the truth value of the cause and effect relationship. It is only this broader
perspective, from which it is possible to understand why David, the great king of
Juda and Israel, repented of organising a plebiscite, of an action to be preserved
for God (2 Samuel, 24, 10). In the same way, it is only “the remnant of Israel”,
placing its hope into God, that can survive (Zephaniah, 3, 11–13). Without mod-
esty and the awareness of the limits on the human conduct, it is easy to stray from
the right way. A good example for that modesty can be found by looking at the is-
sue of ecology-oriented policies.
According to Martin Buber, causality must be complemented by spirituality
(the relationship of “I – It” must be complemented by that of “I – Thou”). Other-
wise, people will miss even the standards of “moralia minima”. Spiritual values
are hidden in the language, or rather in the process of communication, which is be-
cause spiritual values are not given in advance. Instead, they are revealed in dia-
logues (Buber 1995: 3, 31, 33).
Those who are not aware of the organised complexity appearing in a society are
able to practice only the pretence of sciences. There are strict limits on the knowl-
edge about society and on the institutional interference of the state with social pro-
cesses, Hayek argues (Hayek 1974). He contends that
“The recognition of the insuperable limits to his knowledge ought indeed to teach the student
of society a lesson of humility which should guard him against becoming an accomplice in
men’s fatal striving to control society – a striving which makes him not only a tyrant over his
fellows, but which may well make him the destroyer of a civilization which no brain has de-
signed but which has grown from the free efforts of millions of individuals.”
4. PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY
From a sociological perspective, occupation means the pursuit of a profession,
that is, integration into bureaucratically organised social mechanisms (Kasher
2005: 67). Being a member of a profession means independence in the Western
part of the world after the French revolution, that is, liberation from the hierar-
chies of feudalism. While being regulated, a modern profession disposes with the
strict rules of guilds that precluded competition.
Professional activity is part of the professional practice which is presupposed
by systematic regulation. The major components of the professional practice are
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relevant knowledge, competence in problem solving and understanding the social
environment of a profession and the professional spirit. Normally, the rules of a
profession do not come from the outside world, but they are the product of practic-
ing the profession itself. A profession cannot be recognised by what a professional
does, but rather by the way in which a professional takes part in the practice of his
or her profession (Kasher 2005: 73–75).
A profession is constrained by its own rules, but it also enjoys autonomy in de-
termining how its representatives subject themselves to those rules and how they
interpret the profession itself. There has been a dense net of professional rules by
which individual autonomies are constrained within the profession. Following the
rules of a profession means limits indeed. These rules, however, cannot be consid-
ered as instructions, instead, they are standards that are the posts of guidance
rather than strict regulations. Being part of a profession means boundaries, while
it also suggests an elbowroom for its members who establish their career inde-
pendently (Kasher 2005: 94).
Knowledge and sciences are described by Talcott Parsons in terms of a system
of institutionalised professional roles. Following Parsons, Eliot Freidson asserts
that a profession is the carrier of the relevant knowledge that has been developed
in a society (Freidson 1986: 685). Role-specific knowledge can be categorised as
general, special and formal. Knowledge can be ascertained not only as the body of
professions, but it can also be considered as a means of enforcing the claims for
acquiring social positions. Professions are, in other words, the institutionalised in-
struments of formal knowledge, which suggests more than special or even spe-
cialised knowledge. It is a barrier to the profession’s integrity. The professional
spirit can be identified through the acknowledgment of formal knowledge, rele-
vant to a particular profession. A profession is more than simply an occupation,
because, in addition to practitioners, one can find university professors as well
who supervise the process of producing formal knowledge. Even professional
knowledge can be depreciated down to the level of applied knowledge, which is
why only the academics and scholars possess the pure knowledge relevant to the
profession (Freidson 1986: 689–690).
The pursuit of a profession must be put in a social context, so that none remains
simply a matter of technical rationality, or a positivist epistemology of practice.
An alternative for the mere use by professionals of technical rationality is the re-
flective one. Reflection goes beyond what is routine and rigour in the practitio-
ner’s everyday life, suggesting orientation towards what is relevant to the social
environment, towards the praxis of a profession and towards the personal commit-
ments of practitioners. The reflective rationality of practitioners consists of the
moments of “refection-in-action” and “reflection-on-action”. Donald Schön ex-
plains that the moment of the “reflection-in-action” can be interpreted as “think-
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ing on our feet”, meaning the exploration and interpretation of the personal past.
He writes (Schön 1983: 68):
“The practitioner allows himself to experience surprise, puzzlement, or confusion in a situa-
tion which he finds uncertain or unique. He reflects on the phenomenon before him, and on
the prior understandings which have been implicit in his behaviour. He carries out an experi-
ment which serves to generate both a new understanding of the phenomenon and a change in
the situation.”
The exercise of “reflection-on-action” presupposes, in turn, an encounter
through which a practitioner can take a look at the world, using a repertoire of re-
flections (Schön 1983: 138):
“When a practitioner makes sense of a situation he perceives to be unique, he sees it as some-
thing already present in his repertoire. To see this site as that one is not to subsume the first
under a familiar category or rule. It is, rather, to see the unfamiliar, unique situation as both
similar to and different from the familiar one, without at first being able to say similar or dif-
ferent with respect to what. The familiar situation functions as a precedent, or a metaphor, or
(...) an exemplar for the unfamiliar one.”
Freidson describes the status of an academic by being engaged in teaching and
doing research, which two roles are inseparable from each other. Research can
hardly give existential independence, as there are no clients from whom it would
be possible to earn. The publication of papers gives, however, prestige and the
possibility to exercise influence on the whole profession. Professors earn regu-
larly and have clients, that is, the students, but, they do not enjoy as much prestige
as scholars (Freidson 1986: 692). One can add to the observations of Freidson that
in the academia the historical model of clerical intellectuals has been valid to date
who teach and do research at the same time, and who can do that because, being
under the auspices of the (Catholic) Church, enjoy freedom from feudal powers.
Importantly, a profession can be described not only by the roles to be filled by
the members of the profession, but also by the interests they have in obtaining var-
ious positions in professional organisations, and by the identity to be developed in
relation to the position held. From a perspective of functionalism, a profession
means the creation and dissemination through professional roles of formal knowl-
edge, and, from a perspective of organisational positions, the identity authenti-
cally represented by the competent professional bodies (Freidson 1986: 698).
5. BUSINESS MANAGEMENT AND “BONA FIDE” PROFESSIONS
For the time being, a business manager is somewhat different from the representa-
tive of a bona fide profession. To repeat, the criteria of a bona fide profession are:
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formal knowledge, license, professional autonomy and the standards of ethical
codes. Looking at the contents of the activities that are covered by the academic
master programme of business administration, two major fields of proficiency can
be distinguished: economic advising and management. The former can be com-
pared to the normal professions of lawyers, doctors and the like. The latter is of ru-
dimentary nature for the purposes of designing a well-regulated profession. The
contents of managerial activities can be approximated by the term of POSDCORB
(Planning, Organising, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting and Budget-
ing), introduced by Luther Gulick (1937). For the students of business administra-
tion, professional standards may consist of the patterns of managers.
The regulation of professions may be diverse, depending on the culture in
which they are pursued. Although the legal profession is one of the oldest ones, no
uniform regulation has been developed. In some jurisdictions, two different pro-
fessions can be identified within the regulated profession of lawyers: barristers
and solicitors. The members of the former profession, being part of the judiciary
system, are traditionally not allowed directly to get contacted by clients. Instead,
they are hired by the solicitors to express their professional opinion and represent
the solicitor’s client before the courts. Solicitors are close to business advisors, as-
sisting their clients in business planning, focusing on the legal side of the complex
matters of business. For economic advisors as the representatives of a would-be
profession, the model of solicitors can be a good pattern to follow, as much as the
profession-in-formation of economic advisors could, in turn, serve as an ideal for
the managers of businesses.
The basic components of a profile of the profession of business management
can be summarised as follows:
– A key to developing particular formal knowledge is the study of theoretical and
applied economics and the theory of administration. The relationship between
economics and the theory of administration is still not clear. It is even doubtful
if the study of administration is of scientific competence, although the disci-
plines of both public and business administration are of high importance in
practice.
– The current system of licensing must be dramatically improved. Releasing a
master’s degree is not enough, as it must be complemented by a professional
exam, following a period of time spent in service. A model for that can be the
professional exam of lawyers that can be taken following a practice of about
three years (an example for this is the system of the so-called “zweites
Staatsexamen” in Germany). It is still doubtful if the current professional pro-
file of managers suits the requirement of a professional exam to be taken fol-
lowing the university degree. Still, managers should be expected to meet a set
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of standards, close to fiduciary duties. The study of corporate governance
could also be useful while designing appropriate standards.
– The development of professional autonomy is crucial, which serves mainly as a
shield for managers against being unethical. The professional rules arising
from this spirit may function as a filter of commercial reasoning in the every-
day life of the professional practice. The spirit of profession obviously negoti-
ates a corporate spirit. Accordingly, disciplinary measures can be introduced,
so that functional differentiation arises, which takes place first by way of
self-reflection. It suggests a process of coordination, in which the recursively
determined forms of social cooperation can be developed. At the same time,
the appropriate forms of actions will be selected by way of providing the obser-
vation of the relevant social background. A profession must thus not dispense
with functional differentiation by developing the intrinsic nature of the given
profession, or by following a way in which the members of a particular profes-
sion can determine their relationship to the outward business community.
– The development of ethical codes is vital, but they must not interfere with the
autonomy of the profession’s members. They can rather represent the stan-
dards that can be built in the ordinary practice. It is important not only to create
an ethical code, but also to organise the forum at which the implementation of
the ethical rules can be discussed. These rules can be filled up by life in the pro-
cess of the interpretation only. If the different interpretations conflict with each
other, it must be solved with a view to the respect of the profession’s integrity.
6. ETHICS AND INTEGRITY IN THE PROFESSION OF LAWYERS
Lawyers (advocates in Europe, attorneys-at-law in America) are widely expected
to contribute to the consolidation of the legal system in which they work. In most
European jurisdictions, the legal profession falls within the scope of comprehen-
sive and categorical legal regulation. It is yet less subject to the aspects of moral-
ity, although the attorney–client relationship cannot be interpreted without taking
ethical requirements into consideration. These issues can be explained in brief as
follows:
– Loyalty to the client requires the furtherance of the client matters. Indeed, the
client can certainly expect that his or her attorney will assist him or her in en-
forcing his or her rights. It is the lawyer’s duty at the same time to help the cli-
ent with getting in compliance with the law, which may raise difficulties where
the service of clients is in conflict with the requirement of legal compliance.
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– A lawyer is required to be impartial and serve as the actor of negotiating the
ideas of mutual understanding, reconciliation, and peaceful solutions. A law-
yer, in other words, is expected to act in the public interest, while contributing
to the resolution of disputes.
– The establishment of personal integrity and good reputation requires that law-
yers must be intact from the conflict of interests, so that they cannot be compro-
mised by the intervention in illegal or suspicious transactions. It can also be
considered as unethical for lawyers to limit or exclude their professional liabil-
ity.
– Lawyers cannot act successfully unless their work is protected by privileged
communication. It is in the public interest that clients be provided with the pos-
sibility of getting intimate advice if necessary. Keeping the client matters con-
fidentially, however, does not mean to conceal vices. Lawyers, in addition,
must strengthen public confidence by preparing documents professionally.
– In most jurisdictions, lawyers are prohibited from stipulating or accepting
commission fees that would threaten professional independence. Hence,
“pactum de quota litis” is usually prohibited, that is, the lawyer must not have
any share in the result of the client’s matters.
– The entitlement to personal publicity cannot be challenged, but certain limits
must be maintained on advertising. In general, lawyers need defence against
disruptive competition.
In common law countries, the lawyer’s profession is traditionally bound to
very high ethical standards. It is strongly emphasised there that lawyers must as-
sist in maintaining the integrity and competence of their profession. It is also
widely discussed how much the differences in the financial ability influence the
capacity to make legal counsel. Indeed, professional competence can be preju-
diced where the market of legal services is highly concentrated and clients cannot
get access to good and cheap legal services.
In common law systems, much emphasis is put on the lawyer’s duty to contrib-
ute to strengthening the integrity of the legal system, as it is less significant than
on the European continent to deal with statutory law provisions. Under common
law, legal cases must frequently be assessed, based on the very principles of law.
For instance, it is important to take the principles of equity, due process, fair trial
or the true and fair view of company books into account. They are not disregarded
on the European continent either, but there is not as much elbowroom for their ap-
plication, because it is the legislator’s ambition to fill the gaps left by comprehen-
sive and detailed statutory law regulation, sometimes even by government de-
crees.
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In Europe, legality means to defend citizens from the illegal use of the discre-
tionary power of the public authorities, or to assist citizens in enforcing their sub-
jective rights. Since the public authorities must not interfere with private matters,
it must be discussed how this maxim can be observed in specific cases. In com-
mon law systems, there is no strict dividing line between the spheres of public and
private life, because public duties are eventually traced back to private mandates.
The public authorities can be widely sued and required to pay compensation for
the damages caused in specific cases or by way of legislation. In Europe, the re-
sponsibility of the public authorities is a taboo in many cases. Namely, the actions
of the public authorities cannot be discussed, only within the strict limits of public
law cases.
In common law systems, the public administration is expected to operate in ac-
cordance with the principle of due process (a principle of natural justice or fair-
ness), which is a procedural guarantee for the legality in the operation of public
administration. As the principle of due process means the higher criterion of legal-
ity, according to which the administrative procedure can be assessed with regard
to the protection of individual rights, there is no existing statutory law by which it
would be preceded. Where this principle is applied in a civil law system, it can be
problematic that one has to encounter the existing statutory law provisions, which
are not necessarily in accordance with the conclusion that can be made as a result
of the application of the due process principle.
As a consequence of the strong tradition of protecting privacy, ordinary people
are open to apply, in common law jurisdictions, ethical, or even spiritual values to
the solution of their problems. Ethical considerations are not far from the real life
in civil law countries either. Their application is still not directly left for citizens;
instead, they are typically organised by public institutions, which do not hesitate
to interfere with the spheres of life, which are usually intact from state interven-
tion in common law systems.
A good example for this is the treatment of companies. In the Anglo-Saxon
world, they are normally expected purely to maximise the shareholder value, as
the considerations of the social provision are far from the sphere of company man-
agement. The European approach is different due to the strong tradition of the par-
ticipation rights of the workers (“droit de participation”, “Mitbestimmungs-
recht”). This is the reason why it took for more than three decades in the EU to
agree on the concept of a harmonised European company statute (now adopted by
Council Regulation 2157/01/EC on the European company statute in the form of
“Societas Eurepaea”).
Ethical issues are systematically raised on both sides of the English channel.
Outside the European continent, the respect of ethical and human values is mainly
established on individual decisions. The European tradition suggests, however,
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more emphasis on public institutions. In addition, in Europe social institutions are
clearly separated from each other. Law is maintained in a nation state as an inde-
pendent system, not subject to the values of the religious faith or moralities that
arise from outside and above. There is a strong tradition of legal positivism, the
core values of which are the centralised power of the state and the institutionalised
monopolies of applying sanctions, strictly based on legal rules, and excluding
non-legal considerations. Under such circumstances, the legal profession is less
open to ethical considerations in Europe than in common law jurisdictions.
In the European Union, nation states have been invited to give up part of their
sovereignty. In the early years, it was the idea in the European Communities that
the European authorities had to simulate the conduct of the nation state as much as
possible. Many efforts were therefore taken, for example, to introduce compre-
hensive Community legislation. Later, more stress has been laid on the sub-
sidiarity principle. To date, substantive harmonisation has been replaced in many
instances by the idea of the better coordination between the Member States, along
with the efforts to reinforce the effective legal protection and the easy enforce-
ment of the rights of citizens.
Disparities in national law may bring obstacles in the way of a smooth opera-
tion of the internal market. The question of the development of Community Law
cannot still be confined to that of simple statutory harmonisation, which has been
obvious since two decades at least when the state-centred, categorical, compre-
hensive and detailed statutory harmonisation was replaced by the more relaxed
forms of the co-ordination of Member States in Community Legislation. Even
more emphasis was placed on the self-regulation of professions acknowledged
subsequently by various bodies of the Community. In this way, bottom up initia-
tives, arising from the negotiation of legitimate interests and the enforcement of
individual rights, have contributed to the development of an additional source of
harmonising Community Law. The question of the easy enforcement of rights has
come to the forefront, and good answers can hardly be expected to arise from the
traditional forms of statutory and positive harmonisation. This approach may ob-
viously open avenues to the implementation of ethical values in the treatment of
legal problems.
Being part of the judiciary system, the profession of lawyers is strictly subject
to disciplinary measures. It can be interesting to take a short look at the European
scene. One can realise that the freedom of establishment and services across the
border of the European Community may get in conflict with the professional stan-
dards of lawyers that are regulated by the Member States. It is crucial to see at
which point the EC freedoms must be enforced, what are the instances where pro-
fessional integrity and autonomy must be respected, and the exercise of EC free-
doms must be halted.1
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It has turned out already in the Reyners case that even though the work of law-
yers is part of the judiciary system, it does not mean that a lawyer would exercise
public power. Consequently, he or she cannot be prevented on that ground from
exercising the freedom of establishment across the border and start practicing as a
lawyer of a certain Member State in another Member State. It has been clear how-
ever, from the early time that the freedom of establishment may be restricted by
the intervention of a Member State for a number of reasons. It is not only the dis-
parity in the use of languages or legal cultures that forms an obstacle in exercising
the EC freedoms. There are standards arising from the professional integrity as
well (conflict of interest, limits on advertising, mandatory professional training,
etc.) that are to be enforced by the bar associations or other competent authorities
operating in the Member States.
It comes from the Gullung case that the freedom of establishment can be re-
stricted in the sense that even a foreign lawyer starting practice in the host Mem-
ber State can be subject to the disciplinary measures of the host Member State,
parallel to being subject to the disciplinary measures of the home Member State.
In other words, a license released in the home Member State is not sufficient, de-
spite the home licensing system introduced in the internal market for financial en-
terprises. This is because the activity of a guest lawyer could not be subject to pro-
fessional supervision without being subject to the disciplinary measures of the
host Member State.
Localisation is an important requirement that must be enforced with lawyers,
meaning that a lawyer must not have offices at more than one place. Nevertheless,
if this rule was applied mechanically, it would make an insurmountable obstacle
in the way of exercising the freedom of establishment. This is why the EC Court
requested in the Klopp case a host Member State to allow a guest lawyer to open
an office there, even if the lawyer had had an office in the home Member State.
The admittance will not cause disorder in respect of the national professional stan-
dards, because it is known that this lawyer is a guest in that country, not holding a
status identical to that of domestic lawyers. Therefore, one has to take into account
that the positions held by lawyers coming from different Member States are not
comparable to each other in all cases.
One can conclude from this treatment that the operation of the lawyers’ market
cannot be understood without taking into account the professional standards that
inadvertently constitute an obstacle from time to time to the freedom of economic
competition, which is otherwise the basic rule within the European Community. It
comes from the Wouters case that although a bar association cannot be released
from being subject to the rules of free competition in general, it must be accepted
that certain rules of bar will be issued, even if they restrict the exercise of EC free-
doms, with a view to supporting the professional integrity of lawyers. This clearly
Society and Economy 31 (2009)
THE ROLE OF LAW AND ETHICS 287
opens a door for the assessment of the lawyer’s work even from an ethical per-
spective. It has been spelled out in this case that a national bar may prevent a do-
mestic lawyer from being merged within one unit of business organisation with
other professions (in the specific case, with chartered accountants), which is be-
cause a lawyer must preserve his independence in order to be free from biases that
would arise from the conflicts of interest.
7. BUSINESS DECISIONS, ETHICS AND LAW
It is a key in developing the master programmes of business administration to in-
clude legal education, which can improve the academic programmes of econom-
ics students by opening a door to ethical issues as well. Studying law can help stu-
dents to understand better that business decisions are expected to deepen the re-
spect of human dignity, to contribute to social integrity and to the proliferation of
solidarity. For the purposes of developing business as a profession, it is thus cru-
cial to try to make business more legal, and thus more ethical (Bagley – Clarkson –
Power 2006).
Business decisions are, in a number of instances, in a need of being comple-
mented by ethical considerations. This is because market players cannot be suc-
cessful unless they are able to contribute to the process of strengthening the integ-
rity of society, taking the considerations of others into account. Sound business
structures are based on the balance of positions held by people with different, or
even conflicting, interests. Assuming moral values helps people in finding recog-
nition of the place they have obtained in a society.
Social actions are to be complemented by ethical considerations, and ethical
judgments must in turn be supported by legal instruments. Tony Honoré argues
that, in terms of rational cooperative morality, the implementation of moral values
into the every-day life must have determinants, such as calculations, conventions
and commands (Honoré 1993: 11). Ethical reasoning and calculation of the per-
formance of ethical rights and duties are to be made more exact by means of legal
techniques. Conventions must be made more precise by statutory laws in many in-
stances. Commands negotiating force are insufficient unless they are supported
by legal prescriptions.
Law relies on the same traditions as morals. It is a peculiar advantage of law
that it negotiates values within a hierarchical system of provisions, the meaning of
which is determined, depending on the place they occupy in the very system. Le-
gal rules appear in a well-ordered system of professional logic, relying on a series
of formal institutions of coercion, supported by the centralised political power.
Social conventions are mainly covered by ethical standards, which appear in legal
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norms as well. As long as they are part of the complex regulatory systems applica-
ble to particular communities (e.g. those of business associations, civil move-
ments, organisations of the safeguarding of interests, lobby groups, etc.), they can
benefit from the high level of regularity and proficiency in formulating norms
achieved in a legal system. From the perspective of these normative issues, the
pedagogic side of ethics can be enhanced. For Tony Honoré, a “picture of moral-
ity as a blueprint and law as a structure put up either according to or in disregard of
it is then seen to be misleading.” It follows that in a complex society, a viable mo-
rality necessarily has a legal component (Honoré 1993: 3).
To illustrate the significance of law in improving ethics, the subject-matter of
taxation can be mentioned. Taxation is not workable in a world where people pay
taxes just because they are obliged by law to do that. The performance of their lia-
bility to pay tax should be completed by their conviction that taxes must be paid
according to the ability-to-pay and that the payment of taxes enables their commu-
nity to finance otherwise incontestable public functions. Taxation, furthermore,
contributes to consolidating social life. There exists something in a society that is
more fundamental than legal obligations. Citizens have to share the basic values
of society, the respect of which cannot be secured just by laws. The interrelation-
ship between the moral and legal obligation of the payment of taxes does not mean
only that the legal rules on taxation must be supported by ethics. This interrelated-
ness also suggests that the liability to pay tax must be expressed in clear terms of
statutory law.
The ethical aspects are indispensable indeed. Taxation, for instance, cannot
function without applying the technique of self-assessment. Voluntary compli-
ance is, thus, crucial. Nevertheless, the basic framework of the liability to pay tax
must be established on legal rules, which is not because one can fear that people
will not comply otherwise with their obligations or that the public authorities
would make an abuse of their right to impose taxes. This is mainly because impor-
tant agreements of the liability to pay tax must be expressed in the clear terms of
statutory law.
It is interesting here to recall a passage from Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (Swift
1967: 234–235):
“I heard a very warm debate between two professors, about the most commodious and effec-
tual ways and means of raising money without grieving the subject. The first affirmed the
justest method would be to lay a certain tax upon vices and folly, and the sum fixed upon ev-
ery man to be rated after the fairest manner by a jury of his neighbours. The second was of an
opinion directly contrary, to tax those qualities of body and mind for which men chiefly
value themselves, the rate to be more or less, according to the degree of excelling, the deci-
sion whereof should be left entirely to their own breast. The highest tax was upon men who
are the greatest favourites of the other sex, and the assessments according to the number and
natures of the favours they have received; for which they are allowed to be their own vouch-
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ers. Wit, valour and politeness are likewise proposed to be largely taxed, and collected in the
same manner, by every person’s giving his own word for the quantum of what he possessed.
But as to honour, justice, wisdom and learning, they should not be taxed at all, because they
are qualifications of so singular a kind, that no man will either allow them in his neighbour, or
value them in himself. The women were proposed to be taxed according to their beauty and
skill in dressing, wherein they had the same privilege with the men, to be determined by their
own judgement. But constancy, chastity, good sense, and good nature were not rated, be-
cause they would not bear the charge of collecting.”
The best way is to make agreements in the parliament about the estimates on
the ability-to-pay of different groups, taking the performance of the national econ-
omy into account. The result of this work is to legislate taxes.
The interplay between law and ethics presumes that not only business manag-
ers are expected to adopt ethical values, while taking their decisions. Lawyers are
also required to be open to respect the rights, also those different from the offer of
positive law. In other words, it is not only business managers, but also lawyers
who must not be blind to ethical considerations, or rather to the solutions that con-
stitute an alternative to the large mechanisms of the official society, secured by
coercion and institutionalised and monopolised by the nation state.
Law does not go beyond the mere formalism and instrumentality unless it is de-
signed to further human dignity. However, in the modernity produced in the de-
velopment of the West, functional differentiation has been evolved, one of the
consequences of which is that the regulative side of ethics has been emphasised,
compared to the aretaic aspect (that is, to the virtues of ethics). Procedural justice
has in this context emerged as an important factor. Bargaining is to promise actual
and timely solutions from case to case. The rationality of positive law (as seen by
Max Weber or Kelsen) has been completed by the skills, sensibility and intuitions
of an artist. The ready-made solutions of positive law have lost their relevance in
many areas of the social life.
To date, the institutions of formal social regulation are all the more frequently
completed by alternative mechanisms that are based on self-regulation, or even
self-generation of law. In the latter case, communities can develop with their own
conventions, rules and standards that are generated and sanctioned within the
boundaries of the communities themselves. From a micro perspective of local
communities (like civil movements formed to protect the environment, improve
media, do positive discrimination in favour of the disabled, etc.), regulatory sys-
tems can be developed, based on the coherence of the rules created by themselves.
This coherence is timely and changeable if necessary. It is then of less importance
whether the rules governing the life of these communities can be considered legal
or ethical rules, or just the standards of the social practice followed under certain
conditions.
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The coherence developed in local communities is fragile. The efficiency of the
rules applicable to them depends on whether the macro environment is willing to
tolerate (or even support) the operation of micro developments. Unfortunately,
the macro relations of a society can be far from encouraging the development of
flourishing communities for a number of reasons. One can mention the rule of
poverty and deprivation, the lack of democracy, and serious inequality and ineq-
uity, among others.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The management of businesses is under-regulated. Strong arguments suggest that
it must not remain so. Business must not consist purely of the bargaining of con-
tracting parties engaged in zero-sum games. Instead, it should be pursued with re-
gard to reconciling the interests of all contracting parties. Regulation may be es-
tablished on professional standards, so that business management can become a
profession.
Professions are studied as a subject-matter of the sociology of knowledge. As
such, it is thus far from both economics and ethics. Nevertheless, where business
administration and management are becoming a profession, ethical consider-
ations may quickly come to fore. The management of businesses can arguably be
considered as a subject that suits for being studied as a would-be profession.
This paper seeks to explore the major conditions for the development of busi-
ness management into a profession. Currently, management is far from being re-
cognised as one, the main reason for which is that there has not been consensus
even concerning the contents of management activities, a subject of rudimentary
nature. This writing suggests that a professional spirit be developed which could
function as a filter of commercial reasoning.
For converting business management into a profession, it is not enough just to
entertain courtesy, benevolence and affection. It is the cognitive condition for the
development of business management as a profession that economics must be ac-
companied by the formalisation and systematisation of managerial sciences on a
level necessary for reaching professional standards. Broadly, management will
not be organised within the framework of a well-established profession unless for-
mal knowledge, licensing, professional autonomy and professional codes of con-
duct are developed sufficiently.
In developing business as a profession, law may play a key role. Legal rules are
able to negotiate businesses ethical values, which can be helpful for businesses in
putting their decisions in a social context. It is crucial in the development of the
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master programmes of business administration to include legal education in their
curricula.
Broadly speaking, the inclusion of more legal regulation can help businesses in
understanding their stakeholders better. Companies may believe to be successful
in the long run, provided that they are able to integrate themselves into the social
environment in which they operate. It is not so much obvious that ethics cannot
survive without legal regulation. Ethical calculations, conventions and commands
cannot be negotiated unless they are associated with
– legal reasoning and the interpretation of the principles like legal certainty and
due process;
– more precision and consistency to be provided by statutory law; and
– the judiciary enforcement of rights and a variety of alternative dispute resolu-
tions.
Where the idea is that business management should be more professionalised,
managers must first show that they are willing to adopt ethical values while arriv-
ing at business decisions. It is a peculiar chance for them to meet both ethical and
legal values where ethics and the less formal requirements of social conduct are
complemented by legal arguments. It is the other side of the coin that ethics cannot
be supported by law unless lawyers are open to the means of generating and ap-
plying law, which are out of the scope of the close systems of positive law. Law
and ethics, however, can support each other where social players are involved in
discourse and find out what the conventions are and what the proper law is, appli-
cable to specific cases. Law is surely not able to assist businesses in their ethical
orientation where there is a Chinese wall between the official society and morali-
ties. Hence, lawyers should be more sensible to adopt, elaborate and digest the
non-legal environment.
Certainly, the mechanic application of legal rules will not help companies to
become more ethical. In order to benefit from law, it is not enough that business
managers adopt more ethics in their decision-making. Even the legal industry it-
self must, thus, be changed to enable itself for cooperation with non-lawyers and
help company stakeholders to comprehend the interplay between business, law
and ethics.
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– Case 107/83 Ordre des avocats au barreau des Paris v Klopp [1984] ECR 2971;
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